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THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS LAND IS MY LAND:
CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK v. PATAKI
I.

INTRODUCTION

Adorned in headdresses and bonnets, each year elementary schoolchildren throughout the United States reenact the story of the First
Thanksgiving.1 Woven into this tale of teepees, turkey and thankfulness
are stories of cultural exchange and respect between the Pilgrims and Indians. 2 Often missing in this depiction of camaraderie are the years of
stolen land, discrimination and ruffled feathers that followed.3 The unfair
1. See Makingfriends.com, Cool Craftsfor Kewl Kids, http://www.makingfriends.
com/fallcrafts/thanksgiving-more.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007) (detailing various crafts teachers can do with their students to celebrate Thanksgiving); see also
AnytimeCostumes.com, http://www.anytimecostumes.com/costumes/thanksgiving.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007) (advertising Pilgrim and Indian costumes for
youth).
2. Compare Carol Quinn, It's Time to Give Thanks, WEEKLY READER, Nov. 1, 2005,
at Si (depicting Pilgrims and Native Americans as friends), with Chuck Larson,
Teaching About Thanksgiving (1986), available at http://www.halcyon.com/pub/
FWDP/Americas/tchthnks.txt ("Every year I have been faced with the professional
and moral dilemma of just how to be honest and informative with my children at
Thanksgiving without passing on historical distortions, and racial and cultural
stereotypes.").
In this Note, I refer to a 1995 Census Bureau study that questioned members
of various ethnic and racial groups to determine what term they preferred to be
called. See generally CLYDE TUCKER ET AL., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS & BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CPS SUPPLEMENT ON RACE AND
ETHNIC ORIGIN 17-18 tbl. 4 (1995), cited inJonathon B. Tingley, Stealing From the
Poor to Give to the Rich: Why New York Should Abandon Attempts to Collect Fuel Taxes on
Reservations, 69 ALB. L. REv. 357, 357 n.1 (2005). According to the study, nearly
50% of American Indians preferred the term "Indian" and 37% preferred the
term Native American. Id. (summarizing findings of Census Bureau study). An
"Indian" can be defined as a person that had some ancestors living in America
before it was discovered by the Europeans and as a person who "is considered an
Indian by the community..." in which he/she resides. See FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX
S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 2 (1986) (introducing important
Federal Indian Law definitions).
3. See, e.g., Robert T. Coulter & John D. B. Lewis, Cayugas Denied Fairness,N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 29, 2005, at 2 ("History attests that Indian nations and peoples have long
been denied the even-handed application of the law."); see also William Bradford,
Beyond Reparations:An American Indian Theory ofJustice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2005)
("It is perhaps impossible to overstate the magnitude of the human injustice perpetrated against American Indian people: indeed, the severity and duration of the
harms endured by the original inhabitants of the U.S. may well rival those suffered
by any other group past or present, domestic or international."); Felix S. Cohen,
OriginalIndian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 29 (1948) (dispelling notion that United
States acquired its land through various treaties with Europe). "As for the original
Indian owners of the continent, the common impression is that we took the land
from them by force and proceeded to lock them up in concentration camps called
'reservations'." Id. at 34-35. "New York State made numerous deals to get Indian
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their sacred land has been an important
two hundred years. 4 Recently, the Second
in this tangled tale with its holding in Ca5
v. Pataki.

The seminal Supreme Court case regarding Indian land claims is the
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.6 The City of Sherrill Court determined that laches barred the Oneida Indian Nation from receiving tax
immunity on lands that the government unlawfully took from their original reservation in the early 1800s, which the Indian Nation later repurchased on the open market. 7 City of Sherrill marked the third time land
claims involving the Oneida Indian Nation reached the Supreme Court;
however, this was the first time the Court used laches as a defense and
held, "standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice preclude[d] the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago
land, almost all of them without federal approval. This lamentable history of
fraud, deceit and dishonorable conduct is set out in the district court's decision.
The Cayuga Nation was left entirely landless...." Coulter & Lewis, supra (illustrating how Indian Nations were treated with disrespect).
4. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 2005)
(recognizing two hundred year history behind their holding); Wenona T. Singel &
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority and TribalProperty, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 2122 (2005) (recounting history of Indian land claim cases). See generally Arlinda
Locklear, Morality andJustice 200 Years After the Fact, 37 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 593 (summarizing Indian law history); Judith T. Younger, Book Review, Whose America?, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 241, 241 (2005) ("The 3.6 million square miles of [America] ...
once belonged to Indian tribes. Now Indian lands comprise only a tiny fraction of
the whole, about 4%."). This transfer of land possession from Indian tribes to
settlers "has been and continues to be a source of tension between tribes on the
one hand and federal, state and local governments and non-Indians on the other."
Id.
Indian law is the "body of law dealing with the status of Indian tribes and their
special relationship to the federal government. ... 'Indian Law' might be better
termed 'Federal Law About Indians."' WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 1 (1988). Four themes emerge in Federal Indian Law: (1) Indian
tribes have their own tribal governments, (2) Congress has the power to regulate
tribal governments, (3) only the federal government can control tribal governments, (4) and the federal government has the duty to protect the interests of the
Indian tribes. See id. at 1-2 (defining Indian Law); see also COHEN, supra note 2, at
xxiii (exploring basis of Federal Indian Law).
5. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 274 (ruling that Indian Nations are
not entitled to monetary damages for land that was unjustly taken from them).
6. 544 U.S. 197 (2005); see Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 273 ("City of Sherrillhas dramatically altered the legal landscape against which [courts] will consider
[tribes'] claims."); Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 22 (asserting that City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation rejected "long-established middle ground" in Indian
land claim cases and created new ground).
7. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202-21 (ruling laches barred Indian Nations
from receiving equitable relief). The Oneida Nation is a "federally recognized
Indian tribe" and "one of the six nations of the Iroquois." See id. at 203 (presenting background information on Oneida). "At the birth of the United States, the
Oneida Nation's aboriginal homeland comprised some six million acres in what is
now central New York." Id.
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grew cold."' 8 Nonetheless, City of Sherrill is presently the standard that
lower courts must follow in Indian land claim cases. 9
Cayuga Indian Nation is the first appellate level case to interpret City of
SherrilL 0 The Second Circuit concluded that City of Sherrill "dramatically
altered the legal landscape" against which courts consider Indian land
claim cases. 1 In effect, the Second Circuit held that laches barred the
Cayuga Indian Nation from receiving monetary damages for land that the
state government unlawfully took from them. 12 This holding, however, is
based on an erroneous and overly broad reading of City of Sherrill and
13
leaves Indian Tribes without any remedy.
8. Id. at 214.
9. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 267-68 (recognizing that court must
examine Cayuga's claim "against a legal backdrop that has evolved since the
[d]istrict [c]ourt's rulings"). The Court in City of Sherrill held that laches barred
the Indians' claim for relief. See City of Sherrill,544 U.S. at 221 (rejecting Oneidas'
claim on basis of laches). The Court stated:
[T]he distance from 1805 to the present day, the Oneida's long delay in
seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the City of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrine of laches . . . render[ing]

inequitable the piecemeal shift in

governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.
Id.
Lower courts are bound by the precedent set forth by the courts above them.
See Amy Borgman, Stamping Out the Embers of Tribal Sovereignty: City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation and Its Aftermath, 10 GREAT PtAINs NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 71

(Spring 2006) (commenting on ramifications of City of Sherrill decision). Accordingly, City of Sherrill's "selective and expansive" style could cause lower courts to
read too much into its holding. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 46 (theorizing on effects of City of Sherrill).
10. See Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (explaining Cayuga Indian Nation was
decided only three months after City ofSherrill); Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at
22 (acknowledging Cayuga Indian Nation decision came shortly after City ofSherrill).
11. Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 273; see also New York v. Shinnecock
Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d 486, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing summary
judgment claim on basis that facts of case could be differentiated from holding in
Cayuga Indian Nation and City of Sherril, but acknowledging that Cayuga Indian Nation and City of Sherrill cases may ultimately effect outcome of case); Cayuga Indian
Nation v. Vill. of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing complaint and granting motion for summaryjudgment in light of holdings
in Cayuga Indian Nation and City of Sherrill).
12. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 268 (reversing district court
judgment).
13. See id. at 290 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in City of Sherrill suggests a
total bar on the ability of Indian tribes to obtain damages for past wrongs where
Congress has explicitly provided for it."); see also Adams, Supreme Court Drops Cayuga
Land Claim Case, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.), May 24, 2006, at Al (ex-

plaining that Judge Jose Cabranes's Second Circuit opinion was sweeping and "filled with legal errors"). "[T]he court ha[s] become 'result-driven,' bending legal
principles or making them up to frustrate Indian claims based on solid precedent."
Id.
This result is particularly disturbing because on May 15, 2006, the Supreme
Court refused to review the Cayuga land claim appeal. See id. (discussing reaction
to Supreme Court decision); William Kates, Denial of Cayuga Claim Applauded, BuFFALO NEWS, May 16, 2006, at A5 (supporting Supreme Court's decision); Scott
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This Note explores the holding in Cayuga Indian Nation as well as the
potential consequences of the Second Circuit's conclusion. Part II explores the background for Indian land claim cases. 4 Part III examines
the relevant facts and traces the procedural history of the case. 1 5 Part IV
analyzes the Second Circuit's reasoning behind their decision in Cayuga
Indian Nation.1 6 Part IV offers an explanation as to why the Second Circuit
decided Cayuga Indian Nation incorrectly. 17 Part V concludes the discussion of Indian land claims by focusing on the impact this decision has had
on the economically struggling Indian reservations, and the effect it will
18
continue to have on Indians seeking land claim remedies.
Rapp, Supreme Court Rejects Land Claim, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), May 16,
2006, at Al (reviewing Supreme Court's decision). The Supreme Court accepts a
case by issuing a writ of certiorari. See Adams, supra (explaining Supreme Court's
decision process). Each year, the Supreme Court typically grants one hundred
appeals. See id. (same). The Cayuga Indian Nation's case appeared on a list with
240 other rejected appeals and appeared without a comment by the Supreme
Court. See id. (illustrating that Cayuga Indian Nation's certiorari rejection was one
of many by Supreme Court). "[T] he court might not necessarily have agreed with
the Second Circuit ruling and might have wanted to wait for the issues to be developed further before making a ruling." Id. (hypothesizing that Indian land claim
cases will eventually be granted certiorari).
14. For a discussion of the background of Indian land claim cases, see infra
notes 19-60 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Cayuga Indian Nation, see infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis in Cayuga Indian Nation,
see infra notes 83-123 and accompanying text.
17. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 280 (Hall,J., dissenting) ("While City
of Sherrill v. Oneida IndianNation.... has an impact on this case, it does not compel
the conclusion that the plaintiffs are without any remedy for what the [d]istrict
[c]ourt found to be the illegal transfer of their land." (internal citation omitted));
Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 23 ("We argue the underlying purpose of laches
is inconsistent with the exercise of laches by the City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian
Nation courts."); see also Adams, supra note 13 (citing brief written by Solicitor General of United States Paul D. Clement) (declaring Cabranes's analysis was "deeply
flawed," "fundamentally misguided" and "marked by 'serious legal errors"'). For a
critique on the Second Circuit's holding, see infra notes 124-88 and accompanying
text.
18. See Sam Lewin, Supreme Court Under Fire From Tribal Leaders, NATIVE AMERIcAN TIMES (Glenpool, Okla.), May 26, 2006, at 1 ("It continues to amaze me at how
biased the courts have become towards Natives." (quoting member of St. Regis
Mohawk Tribal Council)). "The current make-up of the United States Supreme
Court is being called the 'most anti-Indian court in the history' of the country .....
Id. (discussing Supreme Court's refusal to review Cayuga Indian Nation). "In light
of Cayuga's broad interpretation of Sherrill,similarly-situated tribes seeking retribution for past wrongs will be faced with yet another battle." See Borgman, supranote
9, at 71. "Our history has taught us to expect little and today's decision confirms
what we always suspected-that we can't and should never have trusted this process." SeeAdams, supranote 13 (quoting Clint Halftown, federally recognized chief
of Cayuga Indian Nation). If the recent Supreme Court decisions are any guide,
Indian Nations should not expect to have their rights protected by the Supreme
Court. SeeJoseph William Singer, Symposium Foreword: Indian Nations and the Law,
41 TULSA L. REv. 1, 4 (2005) (hereinafter Singer, Symposium Foreword) (expressing
disgust with recent Supreme Court decisions). For a further discussion on the
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II.
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611

BACKGROUND

The Nonintercourse Act

Since the passage of the Nonintercourse Act19 in 1790, various laws
and court rulings determined how the federal government would treat Indian Nations and how they would compensate Indian Nations for the unjust dispossession of their tribal land. 20 Under the Nonintercourse Act,
impact this holding will have on Indian Nations, see infra notes 189-204 and accompanying text. For a conclusion on Cayuga Indian Nation, see infra notes 205-08
and accompanying text.
19. 25 U.S.C.A. § 177 (2007) ("No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty
or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution."); see also Oneida Indian

Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida County, New York (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661, 664
(1974) (explaining that Nonintercourse Act did not allow "the conveyance of Indian lands without the consent of the United States"). Initially, the Federal Government pursued a "policy protective of the New York Indians," striving to secure
their rights to Indian lands. See County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian
Nations of N.Y. State (Oneida I1), 470 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1985) (tracing historical
developments in Indian law); see also COHEN, supra note 2, at 68-71 (acknowledging
initial legislative efforts to protect Indians).
20. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 177 (defining Congress's duties regarding Federal Indian law and Commerce Clause). The Nonintercourse Act was the first act by Congress to regulate Indian affairs. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 69 (analyzing history of
Nonintercourse Act); Locklear, supra note 4, at 595 (explaining why land claims
exist). The Constitution grants Congress the power to control all of the territory
within the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States,
or of any particular State."). Nevertheless, Congress's authority is not absolute. See
COHEN, supra note 2, at 96 (describing scope of Congress's power on Indian land
claim cases). Congress's power must be "founded upon some reasonable basis."
Id. Thus, the actions of Congress are subject to judicial review. See id. (explaining
check on Congress's power in Indian land claim cases). The Court emphasizes
"Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 554-55 (1974) (upholding previous Supreme Court decisions that "single[ ]
out Indians for particular and special treatment").
Prior to the passage of the Nonintercourse Act, the United States abided by
the "doctrine of discovery." See Locklear, supra note 4, at 594 (reviewing history of
Indian land claims). The Doctrine of Discovery was a principle of International
Law that stated that whoever discovered the land had legal title to the land. See
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1832) ("This principle was, that discovery
gave title to the government by... whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession."); see
also Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern NaturalResources Policy Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REv. 713, 714 (2004) (tracing history of discovery doctrine).
President George Washington urged Congress to pass the Nonintercourse Act
in 1790 and then in 1793, Congress passed a more detailed version of the Act. See
Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 230 (holding that Indians could maintain right of action for
unjust dispossession from their land). The Nonintercourse Act only applied to
Indian Country. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 6 (tracing history of term "Indian
Country"). Indian Country was deemed "country belonging to the Indians, occu-
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the sale of Indian tribal land is only valid if the federal government ratifies
the treaty.2 1 Nonetheless, many states still negotiated treaties with Indian
22
tribes without approval from the federal government.
B.

Remedies in Tribal Lands Cases

When Indians sought to have their land restored, courts had the option of whether to dismiss Indian land claims, restore the land or choose a
middle ground. 23 In Johnson v. M'Intosh,24 Chief Justice Marshall illustrated the Supreme Court's reluctance to re-establish Indian Nations' tribal lands when he held, "[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of
conqueror cannot deny." 25 From that point on, the Supreme Court made
pied by them and to which the government recognized as having some kind of
right or title." Id. Various versions of this act have been in force since 1790. See
Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 268-69 (stating history of Cayuga land claim
case).
The purpose of the Nonintercourse Act was to prevent unfair and improper
disposition of Indians from their native lands. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119-21 (1960) (holding land could be taken from
Tuscarora Indian Nation in order to build dam so long as Tuscarora Indian Nation
received just compensation). The Nonintercourse Act, however, did not attempt
to control the conduct of Indians. See CANBY, supra note 4, at 11-12 (offering historical overview of Federal Indian Law).
The United States federal government has plenary power over the Indian
tribes, which stems from three sources. See MONROE PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN: READINGS, NOTES AND CASES 16 (1973) (exploring federal government's
sources of power in Federal Indian Law). The Constitution grants the President
powers to make treaties and also grants Congress power "to regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... " See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("The President shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties ..
"); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[Congress has power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."); see
PRICE, supra, at 16 (analyzing federal government's power over Indian affairs). In
addition, the Supreme Court has applied a canon of construction to justify their
power over Indian tribes. See id. at 17 (same). For a further discussion of the
court's canon of construction, see infra note 25. Moreover, the federal government's authority is "inherent in the federal government's ownership of the land
which the tribal units occupy." Id. (citingJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1832)
(footnote omitted)).
21. See Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 678 (concluding Indians could bring claim
against government for land treaties that were invalid under Nonintercourse Act).
22. See Locklear, supra note 4, at 595 (detailing unjust practices of state
governments).
23. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 22 (explaining "spectrum of
choices" for courts when examining Indian land claim cases).
24. 21 U.S. 543 (1832).
25. Id. at 588. The courts have traditionally employed a canon of construction that when given the option, they construe treaties in favor of Indian Nations.
See CANBY, supra note 4, at 12 (describing canon of construction); see also Borgman,
supra note 9, at 63 (summarizing canon of construction). Three ChiefJustice Marshall opinions helped form this canon of construction: Johnson v. M'Intosh, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia. See, e.g., Borgman, supra note 9, at 63
(citing holdings in each of these cases (footnote omitted)). In Johnson v. M'Intosh,
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it clear that when given the option, they would not restore tribal lands, but
instead would turn to other remedies, such as monetary damages. 26 Two
Supreme Court cases involving the Oneida Indian Nation demonstrate
this "middle ground."2 7 In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nations
("Oneida f,),28 the Supreme Court ruled that Indian Nations had a right to
bring land claims to federal court. 29 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nations ("Oneida If')30 expanded upon that ruling and held that Indian Nations could seek monetary damages for land that the state governments
unlawfully took from them. 3 1 In the most recent Indian land claim cases,
however, the American Court system took a much harsher approach on
32
reparation claims and used laches as an equitable defense.
ChiefJustice Marshall recognized the legal right of Indians to their lands, but also
noted that those rights existed at the "sufferance of the federal government." See
21 U.S. at 546 ("[A]I1 the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this
continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognised in others, the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians."),
discussed in, CANBY, supra note 4, at 12-13 (surveying development of this doctrine).
The second case was Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, in which Marshall characterized
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" and "wards." See 30 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1831) (holding that Indian tribes were not foreign states but rather "ward" nations within "guardian" United States), quoted and discussed in, CANBY, supra note 4,
at 14-15. The final case was Worcester v. Georgia, whereby Marshall concluded that
the Cherokee Nation, and in effect all Indian Nations, are distinct communities
where the state has no jurisdiction. See generally 30 U.S. 515 (1832), quoted and
discussed in, CANBY, supra note 4, at 15-16.

26. See MIntosh, 21 U.S. at 591 (upholding U.S. titles to Indian lands). But see
Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985) (awarding Oneida tribe fair rental value plus
interest for their land claim).
27. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 22 ("Until recently, courts have
chosen a version of the middle ground, best exemplified by the Supreme Court's
decisions in the Oneida Indian Nation's land claims where Indian tribes brought
legal (as opposed to equitable) claims against states, political subdivisions and private landowners.").
28. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
29. See id. at 667 ("Given the nature and source of the possessory rights of
Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands, particularly when confirmed by treaty, it is
plain that the complaint asserted a controversy arising under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States.").
30. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
31. See id. at 230 (allowing Indian Nations to bring land claims).
32. Compare Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 244-45 n.16 (1985) (holding that counties
and state of New York were liable for damages to Oneida tribe but also noting "it is
questionable whether laches properly could be applied"), and Ewert v. Bluejacket,
259 U.S. 129, 137 (1922) (rejecting use of laches defense), with City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005) (holding that laches barred Indians' claim for relief), and Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273
(2d Cir. 2005) ("We understand Sherrill to hold that equitable doctrines, such as
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, can, in appropriate circumstances, be applied to Indian land claims, even when such a claim is legally viable and within the
statute of limitations."). See also Borgman, supra note 9, at 60 ("After these two
cases, the message is clear: the American Court system will no longer sympathize
with tribes seeking retribution for past wrongs.").
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The Doctrine of Laches

Laches is an equitable doctrine, by which a court denies relief to a
party that waited too long to bring a claim when that "delay that makes it
inequitable to accord the relief sought."3 3 Thus, "o ne party's inaction
and the other's legitimate reliance" are the underlying principles of the
laches doctrine. 34 The laches doctrine was developed to "protect goodfaith transactions against those who have slept upon their rights, with
knowledge and ample opportunity to assert them .... ,,35 The laches defense, however, may only be used in courts of equity and does not apply in
36
actions at law.
Before 2005, it seemed unclear whether the laches doctrine could bar
Indians from land claims in cases involving treaties made in violation of
the Nonintercourse Act. 37 This uncertainty is apparent in several Su33. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 128; see, e.g., Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892) (holding doctrine of laches barred Indian from recovering their tribal land).
34. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217; see also Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380
U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("[T]he right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them.").
35. Ewert, 259 U.S. at 138 (concluding that doctrine of laches did not bar
Indians from their land claims).
36. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 128 (defining laches).
37. Compare Felix, 145 U.S. at 330 (concluding that time lapse barred Sioux
Nation from recovering their tribal land), and Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United
States, 272 U.S. 351, 357 (1926) (stating that it is near impossible to allow Indians
to reclaim their lands because it would inconvenience too many settlers), with
Brooks v. Nez Perce County, 670 F.2d 835, 836 (9th Cir. 1982) (ruling neither
statute of limitations nor laches barred Indians' land claims), Schaghticoke Tribe
of Indians v. Kent Sch. Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780, 781 (D. Conn. 1976) (explaining
laches cannot prevent Indians from reclaiming title to their land), and Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S. R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 804 (D.R.I. 1976)
(concluding defense of laches could not be used to bar Indian's land claim).
When examining whether the laches defense applies courts may consider the
lapse in time, the change in the character of the property and the "inequity of
permitting the claim to be enforced." See, e.g., City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-18
(explaining long lapse of time where Oneida Indian Nation did not bring claim
and change in "character of the property" could bar Oneida Nation from remedy);
see also Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373 (1892) (declaring lapse of time is not
sole determinant in applying laches doctrine). In the Second Circuit, laches is a
question of fact for the district court. See Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time
Prods., 17 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that appellate courts could not
order complete dismissal of laches claim).
Traditionally, the United States is not subject to the defense of laches. See
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 279 (2d Cir. 2005) (arguing
why laches should apply to present case). Previously, the Second Circuit held that
laches could not be applied to a suit by the United States. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1074 (2d Cir. 1982) ("It is clearly established that
a suit by the United States as trustee on behalf of an Indian tribe is not subject to
state delay-based defenses."). Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit outlined three exceptions in which the defense of laches could apply to the United States. See
United States v. Admin. Enters. Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that doctrine of laches did apply to federal government).
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preme Court opinions. 38 In 1892, the Court in Felix v. Patrick9 used the
laches doctrine to bar Indian claims. 40 The Felix Court explained that if it
allowed the Dakota Indian tribe to bring its land claim, the Court would
encourage other Indian Nations to bring similar land claims, which the
Supreme Court wanted to discourage as it would inconvenience non-Indian settlers. 4 1 Conversely, in Ewert v. Bluejacket,4 2 the Court rejected the
laches doctrine and explained that it could not be used to protect someone who committed an unlawful act. 4 3 Both of these holdings have been
44
used to justify Supreme Court, circuit and district court holdings.
2.

The Oneida Trilogy

The most noted and recent Supreme Court cases involve the Oneida
Indian Nation, one of the six nations of the Iroquois. 45 In Oneida I and
Oneida II, the Supreme Court ruled tribal nations could bring land
of Sherrill ruled laches
claims. 46 Most recently, the Supreme Court in City
47
barred Indian nations from bringing land claims.
In Oneida I, the first in the Oneida Indian Nation trilogy, the Oneida
Indian Nation asserted that the land they ceded to the New York state
government in 1795 violated the Nonintercourse Act Treaty because the
federal government did not ratify the treaty. 4 8 The Oneida Indian Nation
38. See, e.g., City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216 (asserting laches bars Indian land
claims); Felix, 145 U.S. at 330 (allowing laches to bar Indian land claims). But see
Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 226 (1985) (allowing Indians to bring forth land claims);
Ewert, 259 U.S. at 138 (ruling laches does not bar Indian land claims).
39. 145 U.S. 317 (1892).
40. See id. at 335 (forbidding Indian Nations from bringing land claims).
41. See id. at 335 (explaining that if Indians bring land claims, non-Indians
will be forced to leave their homes and progress that non-Indians made with land
will be undone).
42. 259 U.S. 129 (1922).
43. See id. at 138 ("An act done in violation of statutory prohibition is void and
confers no right upon the wrongdoer.").
44. CompareCity of Sherrill v. Oneida Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005)
(electing to base its holding on Felix), with Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 232 (1985)
(using Ewert as its precedent). Nevertheless, in City of Sherrill, the Court asserted
that it did not overrule Oneida II because "the question of damages for the Tribe's
City of Sherrill, 544
ancient dispossession [was] not at issue in [City of Sherrill].
U.S. at 221.
45. See generally, City of Sherrill,544 U.S. 197; Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226; Oneida I,
414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974) (concluding Indians could bring claim against government for land treaties that were invalid under Nonintercourse Act); see also Coulter
& Lewis, supra note 3 (differentiating between Oneida II and City of Sherrill while
also discussing importance of both holdings).
46. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 230 (holding Indians "may have a live cause of
action for a violation of its possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago"); Oneida
1, 414 U.S. at 678 (concluding Oneida Indian Nation could bring claim against
government for land treaties that were invalid under Nonintercourse Act).
47. See, e.g., City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221 (using laches as defense).
48. See Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 664 (reviewing allegations set forth in Oneida
Indian Nation's complaint).
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sought "fair rental value" for that land. 49 After the New York district court
and Second Circuit dismissed the claim, the Supreme Court ruled that
Indian Nations could bring land claim suits to the federal government
because they were cases that "[arose] under the Constitution, law or treaties of the United States." 50 The Supreme Court did not mention whether
51
or not laches barred Indian Nations from recovery in land claim cases.
In Oneida II, the Oneida Indian Nation sought monetary damages for
land that was unlawfully taken from them by New York State in 1795.52 At
trial, the County of Oneida argued that laches barred the Oneida Indian
Nation from monetary recovery; however, the district court rejected this
argument, and the county did not reassert this defense at the appellate
level. 53 Subsequently, the Supreme Court did not rule on the laches
claim. 54 The Supreme Court noted, however, that the "application of the
55
equitable defense of laches in an action of law would be novel indeed."
In addition, the Supreme Court indicated that the logic utilized in Ewert,
whereby the Supreme Court rejected the laches defense in certain circum56
stances, also applied to this Indian land claim case.
In contrast to Oneida Iand Oneida II, where the Oneida Indian Nation
sought monetary compensation, the Oneida Indian Nation in City of Sherrill sought equitable relief-specifically, exemption from property taxes
both in the present and in the future. 57 The Oneida Indian Nation argued that their current property should be exempt from taxation because
it was once part of their original reservation that the New York State government bought unlawfully in the early 1800s, which the Oneida later re49. See id. at 664-65 (explaining that Oneida Indian Nation wanted "fair rental
value of the land" because "1795 cession was for an unconscionable and inadequate price").
50. See id. at 663-82 (analyzing whether federal courts had jurisdiction over
Oneida Nation's challenge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362 and holding that
federal jurisdiction was proper).
51. See id. (including no discussion of laches).
52. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 229 (1985) (stating issue of case). "The
Oneidas alleged that their ancestors conveyed 100,000 acres to the State of New
York under a 1795 agreement that violated the Trade and Intercourse Act
(Nonintercourse Act)." Id.
53. See id. at 245 (indicating why Court would not address laches in its Oneida
II opinion).
54. See id. at 244-45 (rejecting dissent's argument that laches should be
applied).
55. Id. at 244 n.16.
56. See id. (quoting Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922)). The Court
stated:
[T]he equitable doctrine of laches, developed and designed to protect
good-faith transactions against those who have slept on their rights, with
knowledge and ample opportunity to assert them, cannot properly have
application to give vitality to a void deed and to bar the rights of Indian
wards in lands subject to statutory restrictions.
Id. (quoting Ewert, 259 U.S. at 138).
57. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 198
(2005) (differentiating City of Sherill from previous land claim holdings).
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purchased on the open market. 58 The Court in City of Sherrill ruled that
laches barred the Oneida Indian Nation from receiving any equitable remedy because, similar to Felix, where the Supreme Court applied laches, the
value of the land increased and the character of the property changed. 59
The City of Sherrill Court noted, however, that this holding did not over6
turn their holding in Oneida I. 0
III.

TRAIL oF TEARS: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki was the culmination of two hundred
61
years of wrongdoing and mistreatment by the United States government.
Up until the eighteenth century, the Cayuga Indian Nation, one of the six
nations of the Iroquois, inhabited nearly three million acres of land in
present-day New York State. 62 On February 25, 1789, before Congress
58. See id. at 198 (explaining Oneida Indian Nation's argument as to why it
should be exempt from paying property taxes on its land). In the early nineteenth
century, New York State federal agents made illegal land treaties with the Indians
and "took an active role ...

in encouraging the removal of the Oneidas ...

to the

west." See id. at 205 (quoting 26 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 138, 145 (1971) (omissions in
original)) (tracing history of Oneida tribal land). By 1890, the Oneida Nation of
New York held only three hundred and fifty acres of their original six million
acres. See id. at 207 (recounting removal of Oneida). In 1951, the Oneida "initiated proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission" for land that New York
State took from them in violation of the Nonintercourse Act. See id. at 207-08
(summarizing Oneida land claim cases). In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Oneida could seek compensation for the "violation of their possessory rights
based on federal common law." See id. at 198 (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 236)
(providing history of Oneida land claim cases).
59. See id. at 217 (citing Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 326, 333-34 (1892))
("The sort of changes to the value and character of the land noted by the Felix
Court are present in even greater magnitude in this suit.").
60. See id. at 221 ("In sum, the question of damages for the Tribe's ancient
dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida II.").
61. See generally Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir.
2005). See also Rapp, supra note 13 (quoting Glenn Feldman, who represented
Seneca-Cayugas after Supreme Court refused to hear appeal) ("The Cayugas have
gotten the shaft twice-once by the state when it took their land illegally some 200
years ago and now today with the Supreme Court refusing to hear their appeal.");
Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (presenting history of Cayuga Indian Nation land
claim case); John Woods, Big Indian Land Claim Verdict Grew from Two-Decade Suit,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 26, 2001, at I (calling district court's judgment "golden opportunity
to correct two centuries of wrongdoing by New York State") (quoting two attorneys
who represented Cayuga Indian Nation).
62. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 268 ("[F]rom time immemorial until
the late eighteenth century the Cayuga [Indian] Nation owned and occupied approximately three million acres of land in what is now New York State."). The
Cayuga Indian Nation's land ran from Lake Ontario to the Pennsylvania border.
See id. (discussing wide tract of land formerly occupied by Cayuga Nation). New
York is home to the sixth largest Indian population in the United States of
America. See Tingley, supra note 2, at 360 (examining Indian population in New
York State). Presently, there are seven federally recognized tribes in New York
State, one of which is the Cayuga Nation. Id. (same). Most of the tribal land for
the seven Indian Nations is located in western New York. Id. (same).
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passed the Nonintercourse Act in 1790, the Cayugas ceded all but 64,015
acres of that land. 6 3 On July 27, 1795, New York State and the Cayuga
Indian Nation entered into a treaty that violated the Nonintercourse
Act. 64 The treaty ceded the Cayuga Nation's remaining 64,015 acres to
New York, and the State promised to pay the Cayuga Nation $1800 "annually in perpetuity." 65 Following this treaty, the Cayuga Nation only owned
a three-square mile area. 66 In 1807, New York State violated the
Nonintercourse Act once more when they purchased the Cayuga Nation's
remaining three-square mile area for $4800.67 Both of these treaties violated the Nonintercourse Act because the federal government did not rat68
ify the treaties.
Cayuga Indian Nation involved twenty-five years of intense litigation,
debate and calculations. 69 On November 19, 1980, the Cayuga Nation

filed a complaint alleging that they were the rightful owners of the aforementioned 64,015 acres because both treaties were invalid under the
Nonintercourse Act. 70 Initially, the Cayuga Nation requested that the district court restore their right to possession and grant them monetary dam63. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 268 (describing 1789 treaty). In the
1789 treaty, the Cayuga tribe ceded all of its land except for an area of 64,015
acres, referred to as the "Original Reservation." See id.(same). The "Original Reservation" refers to the land on "the eastern and western shores of the northern
end of Cayuga Lake." See id. (same).
The Cayuga Indian Nation is a member of the Six Iroquois Nations along with
the Oneidas, the Mohawks, the Senecas, the Onondagas and the Tuscaraoras. See
id. at 269 n.1 (citing Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1303
(N.D.N.Y. 1983)) (detailing member nations of Six Iroquois Nations). The Six
Iroquois Nations and the United States entered into the Treaty of Canandaigua on
November 11, 1794. See id. at 268-69 (citing 7 Stat. 44) (explaining history of Cayuga Indian land claim). The Treaty of Canandaigua recognized the Cayuga's
Original Reservation and promised that "the land would remain theirs until they
'chose to sell the same to the people of the United States who have the right to
purchase."' Id. at 269 (quoting 7 Stat. at 45). At that time, land sales were only
valid if the treaty was between the Indian Nations and the federal government. See
id. (reiterating Nonintercourse Act requirements).
64. See id. (explaining that federal government never explicitly ratified treaties involving sale of Cayugas' lands). New York violated the Nonintercourse Act
because the Act specifically required that treaties for the sale of Indian land be
between the Tribe and the federal government and not the Tribe and the state
government. See 25 U.S.C. § 177. For a further discussion of the Nonintercourse
Act, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
65. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 269 (exploring history of Cayuga
claim).
66. See id. (providing background for Cayuga Indian Nation land claim case).
67. See id. (presenting facts of case).
68. See id. ("[It is undisputed that this treaty was never explicitly ratified by a
treaty of the Federal Government.").
69. See Coulter and Lewis, supra note 3 (noting extensive litigation in Cayuga
land claim case).
70. See CayugaIndian Nation, 413 F.3d at 269 (tracing history of case). In their
complaint, the Cayuga alleged that they were the "owners of and have the legal
and equitable title and the right of possession" to the land known as the Original
Reservation. See id. (quoting Cayuga Indian Nation complaint).
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ages, such as tax funds from the possessors of the land and fair rental value
71
of the land.
At the district court level, the Cayuga Nation case involved two phases:
a liability phase and a damages phase. 72 In the liability phase, the court
ruled that the Cayuga Nation could sue under the Nonintercourse Act
because they were an "Indian tribe." 73 The United States entered as a
plaintiff-intervener because the federal government moved to mediate on
behalf of the Cayuga Indian Nation in order to "enforce the
[Nonintercourse Act], overcome New York's sovereign immunity, and
make possible an award of damages against New York." 74 In addition, the
court recognized that Second Circuit precedent dictated that this land
75
claim was brought "timely."
After the district court concluded the liability phase, the district court
turned to the issue of damages.7 6 In the damages phase, the district court
ruled that monetary damages were a sufficient remedy, while ejectment
and repossession were not because they were too drastic. 77 After analyzing
the market value damages, fair rental value damages and prejudgment in71. See id. (explaining what Cayuga Indian Nation sought in their complaint).
72. See id. at 270-72 (reciting phases of district court's procedure).
73. See id. at 270 (explaining process of liability stage). After the Cayuga filed
the complaint, they moved to name a "defendant class of landowners." See id. at

269 (reviewing history of land claim). Miller Brewing Company was named a representative of the defendants. See id. (same). Also, in 1981, the district court allowed the Seneca-Cayuga tribe of Oklahoma to enter the case as "plaintiffintervenor." See id. at 269-70 (same). The Seneca-Cayuga tribe filed a complaint
very similar to the original complaint. See id. at 270 (same). The United States
govemment was also a "plaintiff-intervenor." See id. at 270-71 (same).
The defendants tried various legal tactics to dismiss the case. See id. at 270
(detailing Cayuga land claim case). First, the defendants tried to dismiss the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See id. (illustrating legal tactics defendants tried to use). The district court denied both of
these motions. See id. (same). Then, in the complaint, the defendants contended
that the Cayugas were barred by various doctrines, including abandonment laches.
See id. (same). The district court denied both of those defenses. See id. (same).
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs could sue under the
Nonintercourse Act and that the Cayuga Nation's action was timely. See id. (deciding Cayuga Indian Nation could go forward with case). Because the district court
deemed the Cayuga's action timely, it meant that the Cayuga Nation was not
barred by laches as dictated by Second Circuit precedent. See id. (noting that Second Circuit precedent allowed this case to proceed).
74. See Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (noting federal government's role in
Cayuga Indian Nation); see also Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 270-71 (explaining
government's entrance as plaintiff-intervenor).
75. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 270 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v.
Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 538 (2d Cir. 1983)). In total, the liabilities phase
lasted eleven years. See id. (tracing history of land claim case).
76. See id. at 271 (moving on to damages phase).
77. See id. ("[M]onetary damages will produce results which are as satisfactory
to the Cayugas.").
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terest, the district court determined that the Cayuga Indian Nation was
entitled to $247.9 million dollars on October 2, 2001.78

79
Following the judgment, the district court faced additional motions.
The district court granted permission for the defendants to appeal on
June 17, 2002.80 On December 11, 2002, the Second Circuit granted the
district court's certification of appeal.8 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit
concluded that City of Sherrill controlled the analysis of the case and ruled
that laches could be applied to Indian land claims and reversed the $247.9
82
million judgment.

IV.
A.

ANALYSis

Latching onto Laches: Second Circuit Clings to City of Sherrill

In Cayuga Indian Nation, the Second Circuit began its analysis of Indian land claims by examining the Supreme Court's holding in City of Sherrill.8 3 The Second Circuit needed to determine whether City of Sherrill
directly applied to the Cayuga's case. 84 After addressing the equitable
doctrine of laches, the Cayuga Indian Nation's initial ejectment claim and
its monetary claim, the Second Circuit determined that the "broadness of
85
the Supreme Court's statements" affected the district court's holding.
Consequently, the Second Circuit held that even though the Cayuga Indian Nation did not seek equitable relief, laches barred them from a mon78. See id. (stating district court's holding).
79. See id. at 273 (describing post-judgment motions). The district court denied New York State's motion "forjudgment as a matter of law and for a new trial,"
but granted the motion to amend the judgment. See id. The district court held
that the motion could be amended so that it ran jointly in favor of the U.S. government, "as trustee," and the Cayuga Indian tribe; the motion, however, could not be
amended so that it ran solely in favor of the U.S. government. See id. (ruling on
both parties' motions). The district court also denied the motion to reconsider
the interest and the ejectment remedy. See id. (same).
80. See id. (reciting procedural history).
81. See id. (explaining how case arrived at Second Circuit).
82. See id. (reversing district court).
83. See id. at 273-80 (analyzing whether Second Circuit was bound by City of
Sherril's precedent). City of Sherrill involved the land claim of the Oneida Indian
Nation. Id. at 273 (detailing City of Sherrill). Like the Cayuga Indian Nation, the
Oneida Indian Nation is one of the Six Iroquois Nations. See id. (drawing similarities between City of Shernill and Cayuga Indian Nation). In City of Sherril the Supreme Court denied Oneida's effort to regain sovereignty over land that they
abandoned in 1805, thereby denying the Oneida a right to tax exempt property.
See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202, 214 (2005) ("[The
Oneida were] preclude [d] ... from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago
grew cold" because of the "long history of state sovereign control.") For a further
discussion on the doctrine of laches, see supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
84. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 268 (asserting that court would base
its decision on City of Sherrill).
85. See id. at 274 (justifying Cayuga Indian Nation holding).
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etary remedy. 86 Thus, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
87
$247.9 million judgment for the Cayuga Indian Nation.
City of Sherrill held that the Oneida Nation could not receive a tax
exempt status for parcels of land that they held two hundred years ago. 88
The Court based its conclusion on three principles.89 First, the Supreme
Court determined that the wrong occurred too many years ago to be addressed in the present-time case. 90 Second, the Court held that the
Oneida Indian Nation should have sought a remedy sooner. 9 1 Third, the
Court reasoned that the nature of the properties changed dramatically in
the past two hundred years.9 2 Hence, City of Sherrillfound that the laches
doctrine barred the Oneida from relief because the Oneida Nation did
not take timely action and the government legitimately relied upon the
9 3

land.

The Second Circuit found that the same considerations that City of
Sherrillused to justify the laches defense were also present in CayugaIndian
Nation.94 For example, in Cayuga Indian Nation, nearly two hundred years
passed between when the wrong occurred and when the Cayuga Indian
86. See id. (explaining court's holding). In post-Sherrillbriefs, botlF the plaintiffs and the defendants asserted that the City of Sherrill holding did not affect the
monetary damages judgment. See id. (disagreeing with Second Circuit's determination). The Second Circuit believed otherwise, explaining that, "[w]hile the equitable remedy sought in Sherrill-a reinstatement of Tribal sovereignty-is not at
issue here, this case involves comparably disruptive claims, and other, comparable
remedies are in fact at issue." Id.
87. See id. at 273 (stating case's holding).
88. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202-03 (finding Oneida Nation was not entitled to tax exempt status).
89. See id. (outlining Court's decision); see also Cayuga IndianNation, 413 F.3d
at 276 (comparing Cayuga Indian Nation to City of Sherrill).
90. See City of Sherril, 544 U.S. at 215 (noting two hundred year difference
between time wrong occurred and present day); see also Harvard Law Review Association, Availability of Equitable Relief 119 HARv. L. Rrv. 347, 356-57 (2005) (supporting Supreme Court decision in City of Sherrill). "The substantial passage of
time since both the wrongs against Indians and the enactment of the governing
laws and treaties often leaves courts poorly positioned to adjudicate these disputes." Id.
91. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215-16 ("Similar justifiable expectations,
grounded in two centuries of New York's exercise of regulatory jurisdiction, until
recently uncontested by OIN [Oneida Indian Nation], merit heavy weight here.").
For a further discussion of the judicial obstacles facing the Oneida Indian Nation,
see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
92. See id. at 215 (noting that property has increased substantially in value in
past two hundred years and that area is now 90% non-Indian as opposed to two
hundred years ago).
93. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 277 (recounting similarities of this
case to City of Sherrill).
94. See id. at 277 (noting that City of Sherrill overturned Second Circuit holding
in Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982), in which
Second Circuit concluded that laches defense could not apply).
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Nation brought their action. 95 Additionally, the "Original Reservation"
was no longer inhabited by Indians, but was inhabited predominantly by
non-Indians, and had been for generations. 96 Finally, the Cayuga Indian
97
Nation, like the Oneida, waited too long to bring their claim.
In Oneida II, where the Oneida Indian Nation sought monetary remedies, the Supreme Court left open the question of injunctive relief because
the petitioners did not present it to the Court. 9 8 Correspondingly, the
Court in City of Sherrill stressed that it was important to distinguish "between a claim or substantive right and a remedy," emphasizing that there
was a "sharp distinction between the existence of a federal common law
right to Indian homelands and how to vindicate that right."99 In turn, the
City of Sherrill Court framed its analysis in terms of this equitable relief,
rather than the monetary remedy.100
The Cayuga Indian Nation argued that the doctrine of laches should
not apply to this case because it was an "action at law," as opposed to an
"action at equity." 10 1 The Second Circuit acknowledged that, even though
95. See id. (considering time lapse between 1794 and 1980). For a further
discussion of the judicial obstacles the Indian Nations faced in bringing their cases
to court, see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
96. See id. (citing City of Sherrill 544 U.S. at 202) (noting that "[g]enerations
have passed during which non-Indians have owned and developed the area that
once composed the Tribe's historic reservation;" and "the longstanding, distinctly
non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants" (alteration in original)).
97. See id. (explaining that Cayuga, like Oneida, waited too long to seek "equitable relief").
98. Compare Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985) ("[W)e granted certiorari to
determine whether an Indian tribe may have a live cause of action for a violation of
its possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago.") (citation omitted), with City of
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14 ("In this action, [Oneida Indian Nation] seeks declaratory and injunctive relief...."). "The question whether equitable considerations
should limit the relief available to the present day Oneida Indians was not
addressed by the Court of Appeals or presented to this Court by petitioners. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether other considerations may be relevant .. " Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 253 n.27.
99. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 (citing Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987)) (establishing Court's framework for its
analysis); see also id. at 214 (distinguishing action at law from action in equity);
Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., dissenting) (offering City of Sherrill's
analysis on difference between right and remedy as proof that "City of Sherrill Court
addresses laches in the context . . . specific [to] equitable relief...."). "The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant has any
duty, and if so what it is, are very different questions from the remedial questions
whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the measure of the remedy is."
City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213 (quoting DA.N B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 1.2, p. 3
(Ist ed. 1973)).
100. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-21 (emphasizing Oneida sought equitable relief as opposed to monetary relief); see also Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244 n.16
(explaining that it would be inappropriate to discuss laches defense in action at
law).
101. Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 275 (presenting Cayuga's argument).
City of Sherrillrelied "heavily on the fact that the Tribe [was] seeking equitablerelief
in the form of an injunction" to explain how their holding did not differentiate
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the "Supreme Court did not identify a formal standard for assessing when
[an] equitable defense[ ] appl [ies]," the holding of City of Sherrill could be
read broadly to include all "'disruptive' Indian land claims," regardless of
whether the claims were actions at law or actions in equity. 10 2 Comparatively speaking, the Second Circuit reasoned that the Cayuga Indian Nation was similar to the Oneida Indian Nation in City of Sherrillbecause both
presented land claims.1 0 3 In Cayuga Indian Nation, the Cayuga Indian Nation wanted to repossess a large portion of land, which would thereby displace thousands of non-Indian homeowners. 10 4 Ultimately, the Second
Circuit concluded that it was irrelevant whether the case in question was
10 5
an action at law or an action in equity.
After determining that the repossessory claim was barred by the
laches defense, the court turned to the monetary damages award. 10 6 According to the Second Circuit, it was irrelevant that the district court substituted monetary damages for the Cayuga tribe's preferred ejectment
remedy. 10 7 The Second Circuit, however, concluded that the Cayuga's
$247.9 million dollar award stemmed from its ejectment claim and that
the ejectment claim should be considered when the court determined
whether the Cayuga Indian Nation was entitled to relief.' 0 8 In reaching its
conclusion, the Second Circuit reasoned that because the Cayuga Indian
Nation was barred from regaining their former tribal land, possession of
between the holding in Oneida II. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing majority opinion); id. at 213-21 (distinguishing City of
Sherrill from holding in Oneida I1).
102. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 274 (extending City of Sherrills holding). The Second Circuit also noted that City of Sherrill does not explicitly limit its
application of "equitable defenses to claims seeking equitable relief." Id. at 275
(discussing same).
103. See id. (disregarding Supreme Court statement in Oneida II that explained that it would be peculiar to apply laches defense to action at law). The
Second Circuit responded to this by quoting the holding in City of Sherrill:
Whether characterized as an action at law or in equity, any remedy flowing from this possessory land claim, which would call into question title to
over 60,000 acres of land in upstate New York, can only be understood as
a remedy that would similarly 'project redress into the present and
future.'
See id. (footnote omitted).
104. See id. (comparing present case to City of Sherrill). The Second Circuit
reasoned that in their complaint, the Cayuga Indian Nation requested "immediate
possession" of the land. See id. at 274 (citing Cayuga's initial complaint).
105. See id. at 275 (rejecting Cayuga argument).
106. See id. at 278 (examining Cayuga request for trespass damages).
107. See id. (explaining that trespass claims are "predicated entirely upon
plaintiffs' possessory land claim, for the simple reason that there can be no trespass unless the Cayugas possessed the land in question").
108. See id. (declaring that since monetary damages were based upon possessory land claim and possessory land claim is subject to doctrine of laches, Cayuga

are not entitled to relief).
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land could not be the basis for other damages. 10 9 Because the trespass
claim and subsequent monetary damages depended upon the possessory
land claim, then, the monetary damages claim was also barred by the
laches defense.1 10
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the United States government
has "traditionally not been subject to the defense of laches." 111 Nonetheless, turning to the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit determined that
the United States as a plantiff-intervenor was still subject to the doctrine of
laches in this case. 112 In United States v. Administrative Enterprises,113 the
Seventh Circuit outlined three situations in which laches might apply to
the federal government. 114 First, the laches doctrine may be applied
against the government "in the most egregious instances." 115 Second,
laches may be used in cases against the government when there is no applicable statute of limitations.1 16 Third, the laches doctrine may be used
"to draw a line between government suits in which the government is seeking to enforce either on its own behalf or that of private parties what are in
the nature of private rights and government suits to enforce sovereign
117
rights."
Similarly, the Second Circuit found that all three of the Administrative
Enterprisesprinciples applied to the Cayuga land claim.' 1 8 The Second Circuit noted that a two hundred year old case was "egregious," emphasizing
that the United States has only been a country for slightly longer than
that. 119 Next, the Second Circuit reasoned that the statute of limitations
for this case did not begin until 1966, a full "one hundred and fifty years
109. See id. (reiterating that doctrine of laches bars Cayuga Indian Nation
from their possessory land claim).
110. See id. (reversing district court's judgment).
111. Id. at 279 (differentiating Cayuga Indian Nation and Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), in which Second Circuit ruled that
suit where United States was trustee for Indian tribe was not subject to "delay-based
defenses").
112. See id. 279 (noting Seventh Circuit's precedent that laches can be applied in suits involving United States government). For a further discussion of how
the United States govemment entered the case as plaintiff-intervenor, see supra
notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
113. 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
114. See id. at 672-73 (delineating instances when laches doctrine applies to
United States government).
115. Id. at 672.
116. See id. (confining "doctrine [of laches] to suits against the government in
which . . . there is no statute of limitations").
117. Id. (detailing why laches defense may be appropriate in cases pertaining
to federal government).
118. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 279 (2d Cir.
2005) (comparing Cayuga's claim to claim at issue in Administrative Enterprises).
119. See id. (explaining that doctrine of laches should be applied because situation is "egregious").
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after the cause of action accrued." 120 Moreover, the Second Circuit concluded that because the United States entered the case to assist the Cayuga
Indian Nation, with which it had a trust relationship, the laches defense
121
could also apply.
The Second Circuit recognized that the Cayuga Indian Nation was
not responsible for any delay in bringing this suit because of the judicial
obstacles they previously faced.' 22 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit did
not consider the procedural obstacles to be of much importance to the
case; rather, it found that the case should still be weighed in favor of the
defendant.' 23 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of
124
the district court.
B.

Dancing with Wolves: The Second Circuit Takes Fierce Bite Out Of Cayuga
Indian Nation's Remedy

The Second Circuit correctly noted that "[o]ne of the few incontestable propositions about this unusually complex and confusing area of law is
that doctrines and categorizations applicable in other areas do not translate neatly to these claims.' 2 5 Perhaps because applying the law in Indian
land claim cases may be difficult, the Second Circuit incorrectly applied
the laches doctrine and read the City of Sherrill holding too broadly, leaving
12 6
Indian tribes without any remedy.
120. Id. (finding that statute of limitations that begins to run one hundred
and fifty years after cause of action arises is substantially similar to not having statute of limitations at all).
121. See id. (concluding that third element in AdministrativeEnterprisesanalysis
applies).
122. See id. (finding that, although Cayugas were not responsible for any delay, this fact is not "dispositive for [the court's] consideration").
123. See id. at 279-80 (disagreeing with district court's assessment that "prejudicial factor" was too important to ignore). As a final note, the Second Circuit
acknowledged the efforts of the district court judge who presided over this case for
over twenty-five years. See id. at 280 (applauding efforts of Judge McCurn). The
Second Circuit assured the district court judge that although it overturned his
holding, the district court judge could not have predicted the new developments
that would arise in Indian land claim cases after City of SherrilL See id. ("Our decision is based on subsequent ruling by the Supreme Court, which could not be

anticipated by Judge McCurn in his handling of this case over more than twenty
years.").
124. See id. (reversing district court judgment that was in favor of Cayuga Indian Nation).
125. Id. at 276; see also Walter K. Olson, Give It Back to the Indians?, CITyJOURNAL (2002), available at http://www.cityjournal.org/html/12-4_give-it-back.html
(describing Indian law as "murky").
126. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("The City
of Sherrill opinion is not support for the application of the equitable defenses of
laches as a bar to money damages in this case."); see also Rapp, supra note 13 (explaining that "no one case is binding on another case" in Indian land claim cases).
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The Second Circuit inaccurately interpreted City of Sherrill for five reasons. 127 First, the Second Circuit did not heed the "clear language" used
in City of Sherrill.1 28 Second, the Second Circuit failed to separate the Ca12 9
yuga Indian Nation's money damages claim from its ejectment claim.
This distinction is crucial considering that the Oneida claim in City of Sherwas a claim at equity and the Cayuga claim in Cayuga Indian Nation was
rill
a claim at law.' 3° Third, the Second Circuit, like the Supreme Court in
City of Sherril failed to fully acknowledge and appreciate the prejudices
and judicial obstacles facing Indian Nations over the past two hundred
years. 131 Fourth, both City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation ignored the
Court's canon of construction and Congress's "unique obligation" to Indian Nations. 13 2 Finally, the Second Circuit in Cayuga Indian Nation erro33
neously reversed the district court's judgment.'
1.

The Second CircuitDisregardedNarrow Language of City of Sherrill

The language used in the City of Sherrill opinion "confines its holding
to the use of laches to bar certain relief, not to bar a claim or all remedies. 1' 3 4 On numerous occasions City of Sherrill explicitly referred to the
Oneida claim as "equitable relief."135 In so doing, the Court in City of Sher127. For a discussion of the four reasons the Second Circuit incorrectly applied City of Sherrill, see infra notes 134-88 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion on the "clear" language used in City of Sherrill, see infra
notes 134-39 and accompanying text.

129. For a discussion concerning the difference between money damages
claim and ejectment claim, see infra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
130. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 290 (Hall, J., dissenting) (explaining Cayuga Indian Nation's claim). For a discussion concerning the difference
between claim at equity and claim at law, see infra notes 140-58 and accompanying
text.
131. See Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York:
A Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapterin Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law,
41 TULSA L. REV. 5, 5 (2005) ("In applying equitable defenses to the Oneida Indian Nation, the Court is embracing an apologist stand toward the many instances
of immoral and illegal government actions against the tribe, and ultimately suggesting that the passage of time renders that history irrelevant, indeed unmentionable."); see also Adams, supra note 13 ("Ignoring these historic wrongs and
injustices is just another chapter in this shameful history of the genocide against
Native peoples in this country.") (quoting Onondaga Nation Council of Chiefs).
For a further discussion on the judicial obstacles that the Oneida Indian Nation
and Cayuga Indian Nation faced, see infra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
132. See Borgman, supra note 9, at 68 (rejecting City of Sherrill's analysis). For
a further discussion of canons of construction courts should apply in Indian law
cases, see infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
133. For a further discussion of how the Second Circuit erroneously reversed
the district court's holding, see infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
134. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 289 (2d Cir.
2005) (Hall, J., dissenting) (arguing against majority opinion's reading of City of

Sher-ill).
135. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197,
212 (2005) (noting that Oneida Indian Nation sought equitable relief), quoted in
Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., dissenting); id. at 221 (observing
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rill framed its analysis of laches to apply specifically to equitable relief and
did not extend their analysis to monetary damages. 136 Furthermore, the
City of Sherrill Court distinguished its holding from those of the Supreme
Court in Oneida I and Oneida II, where the Oneida sought monetary damages. 137 As the City of Sherrill Court explicitly stated, "[T]he question of
damages for the Tribe's ancient dispossession is not at issue in this case,
and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida II."1 38 This clear
distinction supports the notion that City of Sherrill intended to limit "the
application of the equitable defense of laches to the award of forward139
looking, disruptive equitable relief[.]"
2.

The Second Circuit Did Not Distinguish Between Nature of the Claims
As the Supreme Court once noted, "an action at law for damages-

which are intended to provide a victim with monetary compensation for
an injury to his person, property, or reputation-and an equitable action
for specific relief-which may include an order providing for . . . ejectment from land .... ,,140 Unlike the Oneida Nation in City of Sherril, which

was seeking a claim in equity, the Cayuga Indian Nation was seeking a
claim at law for damages. 141 And, as the Court stated in Oneida II, "application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel
42
indeed."1
"long delay in seeking equitable relief' existed), quoted in Cayuga Indian Nation, 413
F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., dissenting); id. at 216-17 ("This long lapse of time, during
which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their sovereign control through equitable
relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes in the character of the properties, preclude [Oneida Indian Nation] from gaining the disruptive remedy it now
seeks."), quoted in Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., dissenting).
136. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("This language makes clear that the City of Sherrill Court addresses laches in the context
specific equitable relief sought in that case.").
137. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 211-12 (distinguishing holding and stating
"[i]n contrast to Oneida I and Oneida II, which involved demands for monetary
compensation, [Oneida Indian Nation] sought equitable relief prohibiting, currently and in the future, the imposition of property taxes").
138. Id. at 221.
139. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 290 (Hall, J., dissenting) (striking
down majority opinion's analysis).
140. Id. at 275 (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988)).
141. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 44 ("[T]he Oneida Indian Nation
brought City of Sherrillas a claim in equity, a request for injunctive relief against the
State and a political subdivision. Cayuga Indian Nation was a claim at law for possession and damages.") (footnotes omitted). "The plaintiffs here seek relief under
two theories, ejectment and trespass. As noted, all claims were brought prior to
expiration of the relevant statutes of limitations. Historically, both ejectment and
trespass are actions at law." Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 283 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
142. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985).
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Even though the Cayuga Nation initially sought ejectment, it never
abandoned its right to monetary damages.1 43 The Cayuga Indian Nation
sought monetary damages, which were not contingent upon the Nation's
ejectment claim, since it initiated its case. 14 4 Further, the only necessary
element for a monetary damages claim is "wrongful possession of the
land," and since the treaties violated the Nonintercourse Act, those cur145
rently in possession of the land were wrongfully in possession.
Another key distinction between a claim for injunctive relief and a
claim for damages is the "disruptive" nature of an injunction. 146 A claim
for ejectment and repossession would be considered "disruptive" because
it would dislocate landowners and it would affect the way the local government operated. 147 The Court in City of Sherrill reasoned that the Oneida
Indian Nation's "reassertion of sovereignty" would result in "a checker143. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 285 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("While
the majority does not appear to apply the laches defense to a claim for trespass
damages, it nevertheless dismisses the plaintiffs' trespass claim on the basis that it
is derivative of the ejectment claim and requires proof of possession.").
144. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting) (asserting that Cayuga Indian Nation is entitled to monetary damages); see also Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (citing Ivani
Contracting Corp. v. City of N.Y., 103 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 1997)) ("The majority
stated that a damages remedy was barred because it was 'predicated upon plaintiffs' possessory claim,' despite prior law in the circuit holding that laches will not
bar a claim for damages within the statutes of limitations.").
145. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 285 (Hall, J., dissenting) (explaining necessary element of claim). The dissent explained:
The majority concludes that the plaintiffs' "possessory land claims" are
barred in their entirety by City of Sherrill and reasons that the plaintiffs,
having been denied the right to possession, cannot prove the elements of
their claims for money damages. However, current possession is not an
element of a legal claim for ejectment.
Id.; see also Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 44 (analogizing Cayuga Indian Nation
to Oneida II because both claims predicated upon violation of Non-Intercourse
Acts). "A legal claim for ejectment consists of the following elements: '[p]laintiffs
are out of possession; the defendants are in possession, allegedly wrongfully; and
the plaintiffs claim damages because of the allegedly wrongful possession."' Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 285 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citing Oneida 1, 414 U.S.
661, 663 (1974)).
146. Compare City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197,
216-17 (2005) ("This long lapse of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek to
revive their sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the attendant
dramatic changes in the character of the properties, preclude [Oneida Indian Nation] from gaining the disruptive remedy it now seeks."), with Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 285 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, there does not appear to be
anything in the money damages award in this case that would be disruptive.").
147. See City of Shernill, 544 U.S. at 200 (explaining why restoring Indian Nations' sovereignty would be disruptive); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 335 (1892)
(declaring that granting Indians' requested relief in land claim cases would "unsettle[ ] ...large numbers of titles upon which owners have rested in assured security" for significant period of time). But seeJoseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths Law:
Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations,38 CONN. L. REv. 605, 629 (2006) [hereinafter
Singer, Nine-Tenths Law] ("Th[e] ruling [in Cayuga Indian Nation] is particularly
disturbing because payment of damages by the state of New York in no way interferes with reliance interests of current possessors of Cayuga land. ...").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/6

22

Germino: This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land: Cayuga Indian Natio

2007]

NOTE

board of state and tribal jurisdictions," which would be disruptive to the
"administration of state and local governments."1 48 In addition, the City of
SherrillCourt explained that the "unilateral reestablishment of present and
future Indian sovereign control, even over land purchased at the market
14 9
price, would have disruptive practical consequences."
As the dissenting opinion in Cayuga Indian Nation noted, however,
there does not seem to be "anything in the money damages award in this
case that would be disruptive."1 5 0 Nonetheless, the majority in Cayuga Indian Nation found the monetary remedy equally "disruptive" merely because the district court "monetized the ejectment remedy." 15 1 As one
Indian Law expert noted, " [t] his holding is in direct opposition to a 1982
precedent that laches does not bar Indian land claims under the Trade
and Intercourse Acts." 15 2 The case the expert referred to is the Second
Circuit decision in Oneida Indian Nation v. New York,' 5 3 which the Supreme
154
Court affirmed in Oneida IL
The monetary remedy in Cayuga Indian Nation can also be differentiated from City of Sherrill because the Cayuga Indian sought a backwardlooking remedy as opposed to the forward-looking remedy the Oneida
sought in City of SherrilL15 5 In City of Sherrill, the Oneida sought "equitable
relief prohibiting, currently and in the future, the imposition of property
148. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 199 (finding restoration of possession after
two hundred years of unlawful possession was sufficiently "disruptive remedy").
149. Id. at 219 (citing Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351, 357
(1926)) ("It is impossible ... to rescind the cession and restore the Indians to their
former rights because the lands have been opened to settlement and large por").
tions of them are now in possession of innumerable innocent purchasers ..
150. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 284-85 (Hall, J., dissenting) (explaining that "proof involved with the remedy of damages will be radically different
than that involved with a claim for an injunction, specific performance, or equitable re-possession in real property"); see also Singel & Fletcher, supranote 4, at 43-44
(comparing City of Sherrills six justifications for use of laches to Cayuga Indian Nation and explaining Cayuga Indian Nation should have distinguished itself).
151. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 274-75 (concluding laches applies
to "disruptive" Indian land claims "more generally").
152. Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York,
691 F.2d 1070 (2d. Cir. 1982)).
153. 719 F.2d 525 (2d. Cir. 1983)
154. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985) (affirming Second Circuit's ruling
that Indian tribes may bring a "cause of action"). The holding in Oneida II, which
affirmed the Second Circuit ruling, still applied to Cayuga Indian Nation. See City of
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221 ("In sum, the questions of damages for the Tribe's ancient
dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida II.").
155. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 290 ("An award of money is not an
equitable remedy, nor is it forward-looking or disruptive in the way dispossession
inherently is."). Backward-looking remedies look to correct past injustices. See
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparationsfor Slavery and OtherHistoricalInjustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 692 (2003) (defining reparations terms). Conversely, forward-looking remedies look to promote "distributive justice" in the
present and future. See id. (classifying forward-looking and backward-looking
remedies).
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taxes." 156 The City of Sherrill Court explained, "the specific relief [Oneida
Indian Nation] now seeks would project redress for the Tribe into the
present and future.' 5 7v The Court in City of Sherrill distinguished its holding from Oneida I and Oneida II, which, like Cayuga Indian Nation, involved
monetary remedies rather than forward-looking "equitable
' 58
considerations.'
3.

The Second Circuit Ignored "HistoricalRealities" Facing Indians

In both City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation, the respective courts
acknowledged that the Indian nations brought their cases as promptly as
possible; however, both courts failed to fully appreciate that, prior to the
tribes' suits, "historical realities" defeated the Indian nations' land
claims. 15 9 "Because laches is an equitable doctrine created by the chancery courts to promote justice and morality, the historical context in which
Indian nations lost their land is relevant to current day decisions on the
applicability of doctrines whose effect is to deny those claims." 160 Rather
than recognizing the steps both of these Iroquois tribes took to bring their
cases before the federal courts, the opinions in City of Sherrill and Cayuga
Indian Nation reiterated that "[i] t is well established that laches, a doctrine
focused on one side's inaction and the other's legitimate reliance, may bar
61
long-dormant claims for equitable relief.'
156. See City of Sherrill,544 U.S. at 211-12 (contrasting remedy Oneida sought
in this case as opposed to Oneida I and Oneida 11).
157. See id. at 221 (differentiating its holding from Oneida 11). In City of Sherill, the Supreme Court noted that the Court in Oneida II observed that the "application of a nonstatutory time limitation in an action of damages would be 'novel."'
Id. at 221 n.14 (citing Oneida 11, 470 U.S. at 244 n.16).
158. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 198 (explaining that their holding is "[i]n
contrast to Oneida land Oneida I, which involved demands for monetary compensation"); Oneida H, 470 U.S. at 231-32 (holding that Indians could maintain right of
action for unjust dispossession from their land); Oneida 1, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974)
(concluding Indians could bring claim against government for land treaties that
were invalid under Nonintercourse Act); Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 289
(Hall, J., dissenting) (illustrating how City of Sherrill distinguished its holding from
Oneida I and Oneida I).
159. See City of Sherril4 544 U.S. at 217 (noting that Indians brought claim at
appropriate time considering circumstances); Krakoff, supra note 131, at 15 (advocating that Oneida did "all that could reasonably be expected of an Indian tribe to
address allegations of illegal dispossession of property").
160. Singer, Symposium Foreword, supra note 18, at 2 (rejecting Supreme Court
analysis of laches in City of Sherrill).
161. See City of Sherrll 544 U.S. at 217 (ignoring judicial obstacles that long
faced Oneida tribe); see also Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 273-74 (reiterating
City of Sherrilts holding). But see Coulter & Lewis, supranote 3 (noting that Cayuga
Indian Nation had to wait more than 185 years before they were allowed to bring
their lawsuit); Krakoff, supra note 131, at 14 (tracing steps Oneida of City of Sherrill
took for judicial relief); Locklear, supra note 4, at 600 ("[The Indians] knew their
land had been effectively stolen by the states involved, and they began a series of
complaints that lasted from that time until the lawsuits were filed."). As one commentator notes:

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/6

24

Germino: This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land: Cayuga Indian Natio

2007]

NOTE

The Oneida in City of Sherrill were not inactive, but "extraordinarily
active in pursuing the wrongs against them."1 62 The Oneida in City of Sherrill initially turned to the federal government and then, when "it was legally and practically capable of doing so, to the counties for relief from
what the Supreme Court found in Oneida II to be clear violations of the
Oneida Indian Nation's property rights.' 6 3 Similarly, as the dissent notes
164
in Cayuga Indian Nation, "the nature of [the] delay" is quite notable.
New York State knew that it had covered this up for generations. New
York State knew that the Iroquois people had complained consistently.
The fact that the lawsuits were filed 150 years later is not a function of the
fact that the Indian people slept on their rights, it is a function of the
State's own duplicity in, first of all, taking the land illegally, and secondly,
doing everything in its power over the last 150 years to refuse to address
and set right those wrongs. When you balance those moralities, it seems
to us that the balance weighs heavily in favor of the Iroquois plaintiffs.
Id. at 601 (arguing that Indians in land claim cases were not deliberately inactive).
162. See Krakoff, supra note 131, at 14-16 (exploring various steps Oneida Indian Nation took to move their case forward). The Oneida could not get "judicial
relief for either New York or the United States' actions" until 1893 during the "heydey of the allotment period." See id. at 14 (explaining that Oneida's 1893 litigation
was their first opportunity to bring their claim). In 1951, the Oneida initiated
another proceeding before the Indian Claims Commission Act "to seek further
compensation for the divestment of their reservation lands." See id. (rejecting City
of Sherrill's analysis). One commentator notes:
Again, while the City of Sherrill Court described this as 'a half century'
after the 1893 litigation, it would have been impractical, bordering on
impossible, for the Oneidas to litigate against any party other than the
United States. In addition, the Oneidas' ability to sue the federal government was dependent on the United States' consent pursuant to the establishment of the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. In short, the
Oneidas, in joining in the 1893 litigation and suing the United States as
early as 1951, were doing all that could reasonably be expected of an
Indian tribe to address allegations of illegal dispossession of property.
Id. at 14-15 (describing barriers that persisted until 1966). The Oneida instituted a
"test case" before the court in 1970, shortly after it was clear they could "maintain
suits in federal court against state and local governments." See id. at 15 (illustrating
Oneida's efforts to bring forth their claim in Oneida 1). Oneida's second round of
litigation came with Oneida H in the 1980s. See id. at 15 (recounting Oneida's
efforts).
163. See id. at 16 (rejecting City of Sherrill's laches argument); see also Singel &
Fletcher, supra note 4, at 47 ("[T]he New York Indians had long sought relief from
the State of New York.").
164. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 288 (Hall, J., dissenting) (rejecting
majority's opinion that Administrative Enterprises's "egregious delay factor" applied
to Cayuga). "[W] hile two hundred years is surely a significant length of time, the
majority fails to consider the nature of that delay and to what extent it may be
excused." Id.
Indians could not formally sue the government until 1946 when Congress created the Indian Claims Commission Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1988) (establishing
Indian Claims Commission, which could hear all Indian land claims involving equitable claims based on treaties, laws and Constitution). Prior to 1946, Indians faced
many obstacles when trying to bring land claims. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 255
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting obstacles facing Indian nations in American legal system); see Borgman, supra note 9, at 66 (exploring Indians' "judicial
disenfranchisement"). For example, there was not a substantive standard for In-
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This delay is significant because, as one commentator notes, "[i]n virtually
every one of these cases there is a continuous history of petitions to the
President and complaints to the governor, to the point where the State of
New York's own records document the existence of the continuous complaints by the Iroquois people. 1 6 5 Oftentimes, though, New York State
neglected to address the wrongs that occurred.1 66 Moreover, it was not
until the 1974 decision in Oneida I that the Supreme Court determined
that Indian Nations could bring a suit for damages under the
16 7
Nonintercourse Act.
Furthermore, City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation based their
holdings upon Felix v. Patrick, which was "tainted by racism." 168 In Felix,
the Supreme Court discouraged Indian land claims because it feared that
the work of non-Indian settlers would be undone. 169 In addition, the Supreme Court in Felix questioned why the Indians could not bring this
claim earlier, asserting that "the courts of Nebraska were open to them, as
they are to all persons irrespective of race or color" even though numerous obstacles, such as language barriers and lack of knowledge, stood in
the Indian Nations' way. 170 The courts in City of Sherrilland Cayuga Indian
than land claim cases. See

PRICE,

supra note 20, at 471-72 (recounting history of

Indian Claims Commission Act). Congress designed the Commission to "investigate historical wrongs and to provide assistance" to Indian Nations seeking claims.
See id. (same). The Commission could only hear cases that arose before 1946 and
had a limited number of years to do so. See id. (same).
165. Locklear, supra note 4, at 600.
166. See id. at 601 (describing occasions where New York State "refuse[d] to
address and set right those wrongs [against the Iroquois]"); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Book Review, Recovering Homelands, Governance, and Lifeways: A Book Review
of Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations, 41 TULSA L. REv. 79, 84-89
(2005) (listing "ongoing challenges" facing Indian Nations).
167. See Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 684 (1974) (noting that Indians' right to possession is guaranteed under Nonintercourse Act of 1790); see also Coulter & Lewis,
supra note 3 (asserting that "[tihe federal government did nothing to stop this
lawlessness").
168. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 46-48 (asserting that Supreme
Court followed wrong precedent in City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation and
should have "correct[ed] this oversight"). "[T]he defendants in the New York
land claims argue they are 'innocent landowners.' And, like the defendant in Felix,
they have 'developed' the land turning it from 'wild' Indian Country to 'thriving
and rapidly growing' development." Id. at 46 (citing City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 334

(1892)).
169. See Felix, 145 U.S. at 335 (contending that if Court allowed Indians to
sue, this would "offer a distinct encouragement to the purchase of similar claims,
which doubtless exist in abundance through the western territories ... and would
result in the unsettlement of large numbers of titles upon which the owners have
rested in assured security for nearly a generation").
170. See id. at 332 (downplaying Indian attempts to bring land claims). But see
Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 40 (asserting that "[t]he courts were often at
such a distance that the Indians could not avail themselves of their right to sue")
(quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 163 (U.S. Gov't

Printing Office 1941) (citations omitted)). "[T] he City of Sherrill Court, like the
Felix Court, denigrated Indian attempts to recover their lands." Singel & Fletcher,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/6

26

Germino: This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land: Cayuga Indian Natio

2007]

NOTE

633

Nation elected to follow Felix when they should have followed the more
current and less discriminatory analysis in Ewert v. Bluejacket.17 1 In Ewert,
the Supreme Court recognized that the laches defense should be reserved
for bad faith delays and should not be used to protect those who took land
1 72
unlawfully.
4.

The Second Circuit Failed to Apply Canons of Construction

Both City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation breached canons of construction and ignored the "unique obligation" of Congress to the Indians.1 73 "[T]he standard canon of Indian law that 'I[o]nce powers of tribal
self-government or other Indian rights are shown to exist, by treaty or otherwise, later federal action which might arguably abridge them is construed
narrowly in favor of retainingIndian rights.'"174 Like the Court in City of
Sherrill, the court in Cayuga Indian Nation failed to fully protect the interests of the Indians, particularly because their claim was "within the statute
1 75
of limitations" and was "legally viable."
supra note 4, at 46-47 (arguing that Felix and City of Sherrill ignore "complex legal
relationship between Indians and Indian tribes and the federal government"). At
least nine barriers stood in the way for Indian Nations who wanted to bring land
claims: (1) "finding a lawyer"; (2) "hiring and paying for a lawyer"; (3) "finding a
court to sue in"; (4) "obtaining the capacity to sue"; (5) "getting tribal property
claims recognized as raising federal questions"; (6) "finding a private right of action"; (7) "overcoming sovereign immunity"; (8) "finding a breach of trust" and
(9) "overcoming power politics." Singer, Nine-Tenths Law, supra note 147, at 615-27
(2006) (exploring obstacles facing Indian Nations).
171. See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 45-46 (hypothesizing that City of
Sherrill's "selective use" of precedent indicates "the weakness of its overall
argument").
172. See Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922) ("[T]he equitable doctrine of laches, developed and designed to protect good-faith transactions against
those who have slept upon their rights, with knowledge and ample opportunity to
assert them, cannot properly have application to give vitality to a void deed and to
bar the rights of Indian wards in lands subject to statutory restrictions.").
173. See Borgman, supra note 9, at 68-71 (criticizing holding in City of Sherrill);
see also Krakoff, supra note 131, at 19 ("[T]he Court, like courts during the midtwentieth century, must at some level think Indian nations are a thing of the past.
And with that unspoken assumption, the Court in City of Sherrill has taken the opposite approach of Justice Marshall in his famous trilogy.") For a further discussion of the canon of construction, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
174. Borgman, supra note 9, at 69 (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 247
(1985)). "Indians have long occupied a protected status in our law, and in the
19th century they were often characterized as wards of the State." Oneida II, 470
U.S. at 258 (Stevens, J. dissenting). This Indian law standard also extended to
cases that the Supreme Court needed to interpret treaties where ambiguities arose.
See Tingley, supra note 2, at 365 n.57 ("Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in
favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith." (citations omitted)).
175. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir.
2005) (rejecting district court's reasoning); see also Borgman, supra note 9, at 71
(asserting that City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation failed to protect interests of
Indian Nations). Previous caselaw notes that laches will not bar a claim for damages if it is within the statutes of limitations. See Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of
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At the very least, the Second Circuit should have considered Justice
Stevens's dissent in City of Sherrill,which suggested that "the Court has ventured into legal territory that belongs to Congress."' 76 Regardless of what
may happen to a "block of land" that was initially an Indian reservation,
until Congress advises to the contrary, the land will be considered a reservation. 177 Congress repeatedly upheld legislation that "singles out Indians." 178 Indian Nations have maintained this "unique legal status" for a
long time.' 7 9 "As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to
toward the Indians, such
the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation
180
legislative judgments will not be disturbed."
5.

The Second Circuit Erroneously Reversed the Judgment of the District Court

Furthermore, the Second Circuit should have remanded this case for
18
review in the lower court rather than simply reversing the judgment. '
182
A district court,
First, laches is a question of fact for the district court.
issues surthe
factual
determined
have
should
court,
and not an appellate
of
reasonableness
delay,
the
of
any
as
"the
length
such
rounding laches,
defendand
whether
to
defendants,
prejudice
of
any
any delay, the extent
ants have 'unclean hands." 18 3 Moreover, previous Second Circuit deciN.Y., 103 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding claim for damages is not barred if
brought within statute of limitations).
176. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 224
(2005) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("First, only Congress has the power to.diminish or
disestablish a tribe's reservation." (citing South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 343 (1998))); see also Cayuga IndianNation, 413 F.3d at 266-80 (failing to
discuss role of Congress).
177. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 224 n.2 ("Once a block of land is set aside
for an Indian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual
plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress
explicitly indicates otherwise." (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470
(1984))).

178. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974) (citing McClanahan
v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Board of County Comm'rs v.
Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 384 U.S. 209 (1966) (explaining Congress's "special treatment" of Indians).
179. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 555 (supporting Congress's role in Indian
relations).
180. Id. (laying out Congress's policy towards Indians and Court's obligation
to follow it).
181. See Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (citing Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure
Time Prods., 17 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1994); Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 624 (2d
Cir. 1989)) (questioning why Second Circuit reversed, but did not remand for
further proceedings).
182. See Tri-Star Pictures, 17 F.3d at 44 (explaining that laches is question of
fact and not question of law).
183. See Coulter & Lewis, supranote 3 (implying that Second Circuit "brushed
aside" these findings of fact whereas district court would have examined them
more closely); see also Stone, 873 F.2d at 624 ("Although laches promotes many of
the same goals as a statute of limitations, the doctrine is more flexible and requires
an assessment of the facts of each case."). Courts generally consider: unreasonable
delay, "prejudice to the defendant," potential "loss of evidence" and the "change
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sions mandate that findings on laches are reviewed for "abuse of
discretion." 18 4 This is particularly important because the "majority
seemed unaware of the crucial fact that no court was open to the Cayugas
185
to file this action until 1974 at the earliest."
As a final note, in Indian land claim cases, laches prevents Indian
nations, who have long suffered at the hands of the United States government, from pursuing any recourse, rather than serving its intended purpose: preventing those who have merely "slept upon their rights" while
another "legitimately relied" upon the land from receiving relief.'8 6 The
Court's recent eagerness to protect the interests of non-Indians rather
than Indian Nations suggests that Indian Nations can no longer expect to
have "their rights protected" by the court. 187 Even though this may be a
confusing area of law, the Second Circuit erroneously abandoned the middle ground of earlier cases, such as Oneida I and Oneida II, and instead
established an "unpredictable and unjustified ground" that leaves the In88
dian Nations without remedies.'
in the value" of land, when assessing whether laches applies. See HENRY L. MCCLINEQUITY § 28 (1948) (summarizing court
considerations for laches).
184. See Stone, 873 F.2d at 624 (citing Czaplicki v. S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351
U.S. 525, 534 (1956)) (ruling courts may overturn laches defense when its use
"constitutes an abuse of discretion").
185. Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3. But see Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v.
Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 266-80 (2d Cir. 2005) (neglecting to fully address judicial
obstacles). For a further discussion of the obstacles facing the Cayuga prior to
1974, see supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
186. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 217
(2005); Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922); Singel & Fletcher, supranote
4, at 45 (reiterating that Supreme Court wrongfully used equitable doctrines).
"History attests that Indian nations and peoples have long been denied the evenhanded application of the law." Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3. For a discussion on
laches, see supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the judicial obstacles that have longed faced Indian Nations, see supra notes 159-72 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of some prejudices facing Indians in the past
200 years, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the current state of Indian Nations, see infra notes 189-208 and accompanying text.
187. See Locklear, supra note 4, at 598 (questioning why laches is being used
to protect those "sitting on, taking advantage of, and enjoying the benefit of land
that belongs to the Iroquois people"); see Singer, Symposium Foreword, supra note 18,
at 4 (criticizing recent Court decisions).
188. See Borgman, supra note 9, at 60 (critiquing recent Indian land claim
decisions); Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 22 (enumerating options Court can
take in Indian land claim cases and expressing dissatisfaction with recent holdings); Coulter & Lewis, supra note 3 (acknowledging that "it seems as if the law was
changed or ignored to the Indians' extreme prejudice"). As Judge Hall noted in
his Cayuga Indian Nation dissent:
Such complexity is best addressed by relying on relevant precedent and
established principles. Congressional action and centuries of precedent
with regard to both Indian land claims and foundational distinctions between rights and remedies, coercive relief and damages, and legal claims
and equitable relief, should guide the attempt to resolve this historic
dispute.
TOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
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IMPACT: THis LAND IS MADE FOR YOU AND ME?

After the district court's holding, Timothy Twoguns, a representative
of the Cayuga Indian Nation wrote, "[t]his settlement will enable the Cayuga people to establish itself in its traditional lands, which it lost more
than 200 years ago. It will also provide us with damages for our long displacement, and financial security."189 Regrettably, the Second Circuit reversed that judgment and left the Cayuga Indian Nation without any
remedy. 190 The holding's effects can already be felt throughout the Indian Nation. 19 1 Cayuga Indian Nation will continue to affect other court
decisions, Indian Nations' morale and the economic situation in Indian
92
territories.1
If the majority opinion is any indication of what is to come in future
Indian land claim cases, the door will continue to be slammed in Indian
Nations' faces and similar lawsuits may be threatened.19 3 Recently, two
district courts extended City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation even further when they ruled that Indian tribes were not entitled to "immunity
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 283 (2d Cir. 2005) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting majority's reasoning).
189. Quarter-BillionDeal Reached with New York, NAT'L L.J.,June 21, 2004, at 16
(noting positive impact $247.9 million judgment will have on Cayuga Indian Nation). ContraJohnWoods, Big Indian Land Claim Verdict Grew from Two-Decade Suit,
N.Y.L.J, Nov. 26, 2001, at 1 (quoting Pataki spokesperson Joseph Conway who
called judgment "grossly excessive" and "completely unreasonable"). Tribal economies are better situated for "economic recovery" when their "property interests
are reestablished." See Stacy L. Leeds, Borrowing from Blackacre: Expanding Tribal
Land Bases Through the Creationof FutureInterests andJoint Tenancies, 80 N.D. L. REv.
827, 848 (2005) (commenting on importance of land interests for Indian Nations).
190. See Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F.3d at 291 (Hall, J., dissenting) (rejecting
majority's reading of City of Sherrill to "bar all remedies"); Scott Rapp, U.S. Joins
Cayugas in Seeking Case Review: Supreme Court Urged to Examine Cayugas' Land Claim

Dismissed by Circuit Court, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 18, 2006, at Al (noting that Cayuga Indian Nation hoped for "lucrative casino deals" with $247.9 mil-

lion judgment that Second Circuit overturned).
191. See Krakoff, supra note 131, at 19 ("Today, with no remorse and little
comprehension, the Court is unilaterally forcing a state of dependency on tribes at
a time when they are finally emerging from that state with the support, albeit uneven and often inadequate, of the other branches of the federal government.").
192. For a discussion of the consequences of this decision, see infra notes 193204 and accompanying text.
193. See Singer, Symposium Foreword, supra note 18, at 4 (theorizing that if recent decisions are any indication, Supreme Court will not protect rights of Indian
Nations); Rapp, supra note 13 ("As far as the land claim is concerned in the federal
courts, the door was slammed in the Cayugas' face this morning.") (quoting Glenn
Feldman, lawyer representing Seneca-Cayugas); see also Kates, supra note 13 ("This
land claim has hung over the heads of our citizens for 26 years and finally, finally,
that cloud has been lifted. As far as the land claim goes, this is the end of the road.
It's over." (quoting Seneca County Attorney, Steven Getman)). Only a year and a
half ago, Governor Pataki and the New York Cayugas and the Seneca-Cayugas had
tentative deals to exchange land claim for two "lucrative Indian casino deals"; however, after City ofSherrill,Pataki pulled the offers. See Rapp, supranote 13 (contrasting outlook of Indian land claims before City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation to
present-day outlook).
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against state or local zoning and land use regulations."1 94 Both opinions
justified their expansive readings by reiterating what Cayuga Indian Nation
expressed: "[City of Sherrill] dramatically altered the legal landscape against
' 95
which we consider plaintiffs' claims."
Local politicians are using the decision in Cayuga Indian Nation to advocate for dismissal of all Indian land claims and express their delight with
the recent holdings. a 96 In addition, "citizen groups" who live near Indian
reservations have also increased their efforts to restrict tribal land claim
cases. 197 These recent decisions, and the accolade that followed, could
cause a further divide among Indians and non-Indians. 198 As a result, this
194. See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Town of Aurelius, New York, 233
F.R.D. 278, 280 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (agreeing with defendants that argued that "based
on Cayuga, the Tribe is precluded from arguing against application of the doctrines of laches, acquiescence or impossibility to this case"); Cayuga Indian Nation
v. Vill. of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining
strong language" in City of Sherrilljustified this holding). "If avoidance of taxation
is disruptive, avoidance of complying with local zoning and land use laws is no less
disruptive." Id. A spokesperson for the attorney general of New York noted:
What makes this significant is the judge in this case applied the Sherrill
decision, which was based on taxes, to zoning and building codes. He has
expanded Sherrill to find that the land purchased by the Cayuga Nation in
the open market would need to comply with local regulations in regard
to building and zoning codes.
John Caher, Zoning Applied to Indian Bingo, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 7, 2005, at 4 (quoting
Christine VonDohlen Pritchard, spokeswoman for attorney general) (illustrating
broad reading of City of Sherrill).
195. Cayuga Indian Nation, 413 F. 3d at 273 (reading City of Sherrill broadly); see
also Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla., 233 F.R.D. at 280 (reiterating Cayuga Indian Nation); Cayuga Indian Nation, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (same).
196. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 13 (describing local politicians and activists
who are advocating for "an end to all land claims negotiations with the state's
Indians and an immediate effort by the state to dismiss the half-dozen other ongoing suits"); Lewin, supra note 18 ("For more than 25 years, I have fought this land
claim by the Cayuga Indian Tribe, and it is extremely satisfying to see the highest
court in the land, the U.S. Supreme Court, reject all claims by the Cayuga Nation.") (quoting New York State Senator Michael Nozzolio); Glenn Coin, Moves
Made to Dismiss All Land Claims, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), May 17, 2006, at
Al ("I urge you to seek immediate dismissal of any and all Indian land claims
brought against New York state in light of the landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.") (quoting letter from Assemblyman David Townend, R-Kirkland to
Governor Pataki).
197. See Carpenter, supranote 166, at 86-89 (reporting effect of City of Sherrill);
see, e.g., Upstate Citizens for Equality, http://www.upstate-citizens.org (last visited
Sept. 25, 2006) (promoting change in Federal Indian Law and calling for denial of
all Indian Land Claims).
198. See Kates, supranote 13 ("[W]e can't and should never have trusted this
process." (quoting Clint Halftown, Federal Representative of New York Cayugas)).
"Ignoring these historic wrongs and injustices is just another chapter in this shameful history of the genocide against Native peoples in this country." Adams, supra
note 13 (quoting statement from Onondaga Nation Council of Chiefs). Governor
Pataki of New York indicated the importance of "cooperation, not confrontation"
and the need to "respect and appreciate Native American history and culture." See
Tingley, supra note 2, at 380-81 (quoting Governor Pataki's veto of Spano Bill that
attempted to tax Indian reservations).
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response could lead Indian Nations to become even more
disenfranchised. 199
Rulings such as Cayuga Indian Nation will drive Indian Nations even
further into poverty and undermine tribal sovereignty at a time when Indian Nations are beginning to strengthen their institutions and sovereignty.2 0 0 "Misguided and disastrous federal policies up until the 1960s"
pushed the Indian Nations into a state of poverty.2 0 1 The economies of
reservations in upstate New York are struggling tremendously with an unemployment rate that is significantly higher than the national average and
a median income that is approximately $15,000 less than the national annual income. 20 2 There is also a high poverty rate on Indian reservations
that "far surpasses the national poverty rate." 20 3 If property interests were
restored, tribal economies would be better situated for recovery; however,
20 4
rulings such as Cayuga Indian Nation prevent this from happening.
199. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 13 ("The latest decision by the Supreme
Court sounds an alarm to all tribes that it's open hunting season on them in the
judicial system and that Indian issues have no chance in being fairly resolved if
they are taken into the courts." (quoting St. Regis Tribal Chief Lorraine M.
White)); Sean Kirst, Land-Claim Legal Ground Expected to Stay Shaky, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, N.Y.), May 10, 2006, at BI (analogizing Cayuga Indian Nation outcome to
Dred Scott decision). But see Rapp, supranote 13 ("After this loss [for] the Indians I
can't imagine Congress would want to pass a law that would harm the counties....
There's no wrong to correct. The wrong was [twenty-six] years of litigation. The
wrong was the Indians trying to get something for nothing." (quoting William
Dorr, attorney for Oneida county)).
200. See Singer, Symposium Foreword, supra note 18, at 2 (declaring that City of
Sherrilland its progeny will "undermine tribal sovereigntyjust as Indian nations are
strengthening their governmental institutions and revitalizing that very sovereignty"). One commentator notes:
Indian people and Indian tribes that now have the capability and the resources to pursue Indian land claims, by conducting the research that
allows them to discover the abuses of physical and political power leading
to the illegal dispossession of their lands, must now pass the arbitrary and
vague legal test set forth by a High Court that actively seeks to protect
those who have benefited from the illegal dispossession of Indian lands.
Singel & Fletcher, supra note 4, at 45 (contrasting progress Indian Nations were
beginning to make with unjust legal process).
201. See Krakoff, supra note 131, at 17 (detailing United States government's
poor policy choices); see also Tingley, supra note 2, at 361-63 (explaining impoverished state of Indian reservations).
202. See, e.g., Tingley, supra note 2, at 362-64 (citing 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. PHC-2-34, NEW YoRKj 2000; SUMMARY SOCIAL, EcoNOMIC, AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 255 tbl. 11 (2003)) (demonstrating presentday disparity between Indians and non-Indians); see also Carpenter, supranote 166,
at 84-89 (recounting challenges facing Indian nations).
203. See Tingley, supra note 2, at 363 (citing CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL.,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

No. P60-266,

INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE

2003, at 34 tbl.A-2 (2004), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2004 pubs/p60-226.pdf) (illustrating poor economic situation on Indian reservations).
204. See Carpenter, supra note 166, at 79 (citing Padraic I. McCoy, The Land
Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal
IN

THE

UNITED

STATES:

Justifications for Placing Land Into Trust Through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 Am.IN-
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Children are often taught that the Indians and Pilgrims remained
friends for years to come after the First Thanksgiving. 20 5 History dictates,
however, that this is not always the case. 20 6 Today, the courts have an
opportunity to correct those past injustices, but in light of the recent decisions, it seems as though the court system is not interested. 20 7 As the
courts close the door on Indian land claims and leave Indians without any
20 8
remedy, you have to wonder, is this land really "made for you and me?"
Katherine E. Germino

DiAN

L.

REv.

421, 422 (2003)) (explaining that "[t]ribal land ownership is a "key

factor in community revitalization, allowing tribes to foster tribal jurisdiction, economic development, housing, environmental health, subsistence patterns, and
spirituality"); see also Tingley, supra note 2, at 362 (hypothesizing effect property
rights could have on Indian reservations).
205. For a discussion of the often inaccurate portrayal of Thanksgiving, see
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the history between Indians and non-Indians, see
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of the recent decisions, see supranotes 10-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the impact of the decisions, see supra notes 189204 and accompanying text.
208. See Woody Guthrie, This Land Is Your Land, availableat http://www.niehs.
nih.gov/kids/lyrics/thisland.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
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